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IntRoduCtIon
During the last years, China is placing an unprecedented emphasis on 
the BRICS. In 2013, the Eighteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party 
identified this group (together with the United Nations, G20 and Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization - SCO) as the main multilateral institutions in which 
China desires to invest its efforts in order to play an active role in international 
affairs. As the largest economy among the five countries and the second economic 
power in the world, China plays the role of a natural leader of the BRICS, since 
the group establishment. 
China’s perception of itself in the global system is seriously changing, 
especially since the 2008 financial crisis changed the mapping of the world 
economy, pushing the developed countries to a relative decline in their power. 
In some way there is a general feeling in China that the country is returning to a 
position of centrality in the global system. 
Moreover, the strong Chinese engagement in the BRICS reflects its 
objective to be more and more integrated into the new global order and to pursue 
the objectives of its foreign policy. First, in China’s perspective, the emerging 
powers deserve a louder voice on the global economic and political scene, and 
the pragmatic attitude of the BRICS is viewed as an instrument that will enable 
the realization of a more democratic global order. The New Development Bank 
(founded by BRICS), represents, for instance, an alternative to the traditional 
international institutions such as IMF and the World Bank, especially for the 
African and Latin American countries. Second, through its engagement in 
multilateral forums such as the BRICS, China aims at improving its image at the 
* PhD in International Relations at Université Paris Diderot Sorbonne Cite’, Visiting Scholar and 
lecturer at the Goethe University of Frankfurt.
RDUNO, v. 1, n. 1, Jan - Jul/2018 - pag (138-156)
139BRICS engagement for global governance: perspectives of the Chinese leadership
international level and presenting itself as a friendly, supportive and trustworthy 
partner, totally committed to the establishment of a more equal global order.
 China perceives its prominent role in the BRICS as an opportunity to 
guarantee its national interests, especially with regards to its relations with the 
developing countries with their raw materials that are more and more necessary 
to support its growing economy. The inclusion of South Africa as a new member 
of the BRICS was strongly supported by China, given the strong geopolitical 
interests of China in the African continent. 
In the first part of the article we will present an overview of the main 
objectives of the Chinese foreign policy, especially since the Xi Jinping era. 
Sequentially, these objectives will be viewed through the framework of the 
Chinese engagement in the BRICS in order to discuss the future of the group and 
its significance in the development of China as a global actor.
the ChIneSe dReam and the new GloBal StatuS
China today is a giant in transition. The Chinese leadership faces the most 
difficult task probably since the Deng Xiaoping era: continue to drive the most 
populous nation of the world with its 1.3 billion people to the development path 
in the new global order context characterized by a transition of power and the 
emergence of the so-called multipolar world.
The challenges Beijing faces are ambitious but inevitable and they involve 
profound changes both internally and externally. China is at an inflection point and 
the current President Xi Jinping appears to realize that the country needs a change 
(SCHELL, 2013, p. 51). The success of this change is based on Xi Jinping’s capacity 
to strike the right balance between, on the one hand, a sustainable internal growth 
and social stability, and on the other hand the affirmation of China as a global 
power. If for a long time the internal affairs have been separated from the foreign 
affairs, in a globalized system these two dimensions become interdependent and 
inseparable.
Sustainable internal growth in the next decades requires proper 
management of the social inequality that represents a danger to the harmony 
of the Chinese society. The differences in terms of economic and social 
development between the coast and the countryside are still very stark, resulting 
in approximately 300 million migrants leaving the countryside for the urban 
areas (KONIG, 2012). The benefits of the economic reforms promoted by Deng 
Xiaoping since the end of the 1970s have accrued disproportionality, benefiting 
the coastal provinces, by generating an increasing inequality in the income 
distribution. If, in the mid-1990s, China was considered one of the most equal 
societies in the world; today its national Gini coefficient exceeds 0.45 (ASH; 
PORTER; SUMMERS, 2012, p. 28).
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The problem of the inequalities in Chinese society resulting from the 
rapid economic boom has been taken into account during the 2000s. In particular, 
between 2003 and 2005 the concept of harmonious society acquired centrality in 
the discussion under the leadership of Hu Jintao and considered an essential 
element to avoid social tensions and disorder. The 12th five-year plan, for 2011-
2015, approved by the Chinese Communist Party, in March 2011, declared 
that in the future one of the main objectives of the government is to guarantee 
domestic coherence and achieve qualitative enhancement of the people’s lives. 
The Party is well aware that the domestic socioeconomic inequality represents a 
threat to internal stability, an essential element during transition. In this situation, 
strengthening the sense of the national sentiment of the people, that they belong 
to a great civilization, through the use of rhetoric and propaganda slogans is 
used by the government to maintain the unity of the society. The anti-corruption 
campaign that has been launched by Xi Jinping is an example of a strong and 
visible measure taken by the government in order to restore the people’s sense of 
trust in the central and local governments. 
From a strictly economic point of view, China’s economy has transitioned 
over the past few decades from a planned economy into a market economy at 
enormous social costs. According to a study conducted by the WHO and a group 
of universities, pollution alone has contributed to 1.2 million premature deaths in 
the country. Over 70% of the Chinese lakes are polluted and nearly one-quarter of 
Chinese do not have access to drinking water. The excessive use of toxic chemicals 
in industrialization has produced 400 cancer villages, in which the rate of cancers 
is higher than the normal rate. Today the Chinese government needs to complete 
its transition from an essentially export-based economy to an economy based on 
domestic consumption and innovation and the social costs involved can no longer 
be ignored.
With the concept of the Chinese Dream Xi Jinping wants to achieve a 
great national revival and emphasize the sense of unity in the nation under the 
party leadership and through the essential elements of Chinese culture and the re-
appropriation of its identity and values essential to building a new socialist morality, 
blending the socialist principles with the humanistic spirit of Confucianism 
(SCARPARI, 2015, p. 9). In recent years, public anger and protests have increased, 
representing a menace for the stability and harmony of society. In this context the 
party wants to maintain its legitimacy assuring the people that it is working hard 
to guarantee social stability and an international environment favourable to the 
development of Chinese society. During the 18th National People’s Congress in 
Beijing, Xi affirmed: “The Chinese Dream, after all, is the dream of the people. We 
must realize it by closely depending on the people. We must incessantly bring benefits 
for the people” (ZHAO, 2013).  
The core concept of the Chinese Dream is one of rejuvenation of the nation 
(WANG, 2013, pp. 1-13) considered the main objective of Xi’s government. This 
means the return of China to its natural state of glory. The recent ascension of 
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China in the international system has reinforced confidence in the Chinese 
government that the country is returning to a position of ‘centrality’ in the global 
system, especially after the financial crisis of 2008 which changed the map of the 
world economy, pushing the developed countries to a relative decline in their 
power. The Chinese Dream can be considered a broad concept including the 
rejuvenation (fuxing) of the Chinese society in terms of domestic development 
but at the same time the return to the global stage as a great power. 
With the concept of the Chinese Dream Xi appears to want overcome the 
dichotomy between domestic and external affairs, typical of the Deng Xiaoping’s 
era. On the one hand, the engagement of China in global leadership is necessary 
to assure its internal stability and security. As Yang Jiechi, State Councillor and 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China stated in 
the document Innovations in China’s Diplomatic Theory and Practice under New 
Conditions: “The Chinese Dream requires a peaceful and stable international and 
neighbouring environment, and China is committed to realizing the dream through 
peaceful development. As the Chinese Dream is closely linked with the dreams of other 
peoples around the world, China is committed to helping other countries, developing 
countries and neighbouring countries in particular, with their development while 
achieving development of its own. China will share more development opportunities 
with other countries so as to facilitate their efforts to realize their dreams. China 
hopes to see win-win cooperation and common development with the rest of the 
world. While working to realize the Chinese Dream, the people of China are desirous 
of realizing the world dream through concerted efforts with people around the 
world (YANG, 2013). On the other hand, China  cannot become a recognized 
great power if its international rise is not accompanied by economic development 
and social improvement. As suggested by Yanzhong Huang: “the profound socio-
political problems are threatening China’s great achievements. Until China can 
address the immeasurable, if not irreversible, social costs of development, it would 
be next to impossible for the nation to take a leadership role in the international 
system” (ZHONG, 2013).
It is important to note that while in the western world people refer to the 
Chinese rise, from the Chinese perspective it is not at all a rise from nothing but 
a genuine return to all its grandeur after a century of national humiliation that 
began with the First Opium War between 1839 and 1842 and lasted until 1945 
with the culmination of the Sino-Japanese War in 1945. 
The Eurocentric approach to interpreting history often ignores the 
dominant role played by China between 1100 and 1800. To cite some examples: 
Since 1078, China was the first producer of steel with an output of 125,000 
tons; whereas, in 1788 Great Britain produced 76,000 tons. Before the English 
textile revolution in the XVIII century, China was the world leader in the 
textile-manufacturing sector in terms of technical innovations. Until the XIX 
century China had the largest commercial navy in the world; it was the leader 
in innovation in the fields of production of paper, stamped books, weapons and 
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other manufactured products distributed around the world through its advanced 
navigation system (PETRAS, 2012).
Considering Chinese history alone, it played a central role in global affairs 
for centuries and its decadence began since the arrival of the European nations 
into its territory; therefore, it is possible to understand what the Chinese Dream 
concept really means. 
While in China the debate regarding foreign policy is divided between 
the defensive internationalists, according to which China needs to play a role 
in the existing institutions of global governance pushing on prudence and the 
nationalists who want China to assert itself on the global stage (LEONARD, 2012, 
p. 11), the Chinese government has created a new doctrine of development. This 
is slowly overtaking and replacing the Hide capabilities and keep a low profile 
concept (Tao guang yang hui) instituted in the early 1990s by Deng Xiaoping, 
with the new one, Striving for achievement (Fen fa you wei), supported by many 
Chinese scholars in the country. 
Wang Yizhou, Deputy Director, Institute of World Economics and 
Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences1 has theorized the concept 
of Creative Involvement according to which China must play a more active role 
and voluntarily involve itself in international affairs. But unlike the United States, 
Creative Involvement does not imply interference; rather, it takes into account 
acceptance by other countries and China’s own strength (WANG, 2013).
Wang Yizhou’s concept appears more and more in line with the doctrine 
of Striving for achievement. According to Xi Jinping, China has to steadily grow 
in confidence regarding its role in international development and play a part in 
shaping this development in a multipolar world (duoji shijie), a concept introduced 
in 1992 by the President and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, 
Jiang Zemin, during the 14th Congress of the Communist party in China. For this 
reason the country can no longer assume a low profile but should take an active 
role in global affairs. For the Chinese this means, first of all, to present the state as 
a friendly and trustworthy partner; therefore, the nation wants to reassure the rest 
of the world that its ascension is pacific and that it does not constitute a threat to 
its partners (NIU, 2013).
Since the 1990s, its rising power has been perceived as a threat especially 
for the commercial concerns, as well as its investments in the military sector. Its 
authoritarian political system has generated, in the west particularly, a negative 
reputation of the country. In order to alleviate all of these suspicions, the theory of 
peaceful ascension, created in the recent years by the Chinese government, argues 
that the Chinese rise is beneficial both for China and the entire world population. 
Through its engagement in multilateral enterprises, Beijing desires to demonstrate 
its cooperative attitude and its engagement to rebalance the distribution of global 
power, giving a louder voice to the emerging powers, through, for example, 
reforms in the existing international institutions, like the International Monetary 
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Fund (IMF), in particular, in the matters that concern the shifting of the vote 
power and by the creation of new multilateral platforms, engaging the emergence 
powers, such as the BRICS.
China wishes to become more engaged and present Chinese solutions, 
diplomatic concepts, shape the international system and be treated on an equal 
footing. However, there is a common consensus by scholars that China wants to 
pursue this objective by accepting the existing international rules and institutions. 
According to Zhengxu Wang, this appears to be one major element of China’s 
grand strategy, rising into the existing world system instead of unsettling it 
(ZHENGXU, 2013).
China is also introducing economic diplomacy which involves the use of 
economic incentives to promote positive relations with the emerging powers, 
especially in the African countries; however, since the last decade this phenomenon 
has started to include the Latin American countries as well.  Economic diplomacy 
is based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the country 
receiving economic assistance, which clearly desires to detach itself from the 
conditionality in assistance provided by the western international financial 
institutions, recognized as the Washington Consensus. 
Another important component of the Chinese strategy to promote its image 
internationally is the use soft power, exerted particularly through the promotion 
of academic exchange, mandarin, its culture, its cinematography industry and 
setting up of the Confucius Institutes around the world with the specific objective 
of becoming a powerful instrument of Chinese cultural diplomacy. 
ChIna and the BRICS: ShaPInG a new GloBal oRdeR?
The participation of China in the BRICS appears to be especially significant 
for Beijing because it is about a new multilateral platform, which draws together 
five emerging powers, each of which has an important role as a regional power, that 
China has contributed towards creating and in which it is playing a leadership role. 
Its participation in the group is considered an important step towards 
realizing its foreign policy objectives. In 2013, the Eighteenth Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party identified the BRICS, together with the United 
Nations, G20 and SCO, as the main multilateral institutions in which China wants 
to invest its efforts in order to play an active role in a multipolar world. The main 
reason for this attachment to the BRICS can be attributed to the limited number 
of multilateral forums similar to this, in which the emerging powers have the 
opportunity to strengthen their power and discuss their inclusion in global affairs. 
 After the economic crisis commenced in 2008, followed by the current 
transition from a unipolar world to a multipolar one, in 2009 the first BRICS 
Summit was held in Yekaterinburg (Russia), in which the four members of that 
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period (South Africa joined the group in 2011) demanded “a greater voice and 
representation in international financial institutions” and “a more democratic 
and just multipolar world”. Thus, BRICS appears to be an expression of what 
can be defined the rise of the rest, which includes not only the emerging powers 
and a series of non-state actors that are assuming an important role in the global 
affairs, but also new forms of cooperation in which the emerging powers play a 
central role like the SCO and others in which certain emerging powers have been 
admitted to the global forum of the main powers, as is the case of G20, in which 
BRICS members participate. 
 Due to the important role China assumed in the global economy, it 
appeared to be the natural leader since the time the group was formed. While this 
leadership generated admiration, there was at the same time a sense of fear that 
its leadership could transform into a type of domination. Its dominant position in 
terms of economic size compared with the other members induced a natural mixed 
feeling of both opportunity and fear. On one hand the economies of Brazil, India, 
Russia and South Africa are becoming more and more dependent upon Beijing, as 
the bilateral trade between China and the other four members of BRICS account 
for 85% of the total BRICS trade. At the same time its partners suffer from strong 
competition because of the low prices of the Chinese manufactured goods. It is 
true that if China wants to consolidate its role as leader it must consider all these 
elements. China has to very carefully apply its principle of pacific ascension within 
the BRICS framework, which, despite a solid purpose of strong cooperation, is 
characterized by divisions and rivalries, in particular with China, and there are 
substantial differences in the issues that concern their political systems, cultures 
and values. As suggested by Minghao Zhao: “BRICS represents a force multiplier 
for Beijing and can remain so if China is careful not to push its national interests too 
hard.” (MINGHAO, 2015). The balance between its own interests and an altruistic 
attitude solidly aimed at establishing equal cooperation between its partners is, at 
this stage, vitally important. 
the CReatIon of new multIlateRal fInanCIal 
InStItutIonS: nda and CRa
Over the recent years, China’s engagement in financial multilateralism 
has accelerated, demonstrating its concrete commitment and determination in 
contributing to reforming the multilateral international financial system. The 
establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB), created in order to mobilize 
resources for the infrastructures and sustainable development projects in the 
emerging and developing countries, represents a new chapter in the relationship 
among the members, as it raised the level of cooperation from that of a lobby group 
to that of a more organized entity, capable of delivering solutions (CONTIPELLI, 
PICCIAU, 2015, pp. 82-93).
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The choice of establishing the New Development Bank’s headquarters in 
Shanghai, after a long negotiation period, does not appear to be left to chance. 
China hopes that the bank’s presence in Shanghai will boost the city’s ambitions 
to become a financial center by 2020. The new financial institution represents the 
concrete result of this cooperation and the resolution of the five members to play a 
central role in global cooperation. The NDB will kick start its operations with $100 
billion as the initial capital and the five countries will have equal voting shares.  
The BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA) has been created 
in order to provide safeguards for the members and other countries in the context 
of considerable volatility of the existing financial. The new mechanism will 
provide liquidity to countries with difficulties in their balance of payment. China 
participates with $41 billion, Russia, India and Brazil with $18 billion each and 
South Africa with $5 billion.  
During the inauguration of the NDB on July 2015 in Shanghai, with 
representatives of all the founding members, the Chinese finance minister, Lou 
Jiwei together with the NDB’s President, K. V. Kamath, former Chief Executive of 
the ICICI bank, India’s largest private sector bank, avoided criticizing the existing 
international financial institutions and presenting the NDB as challenging the 
existing norms (WILDAU, 2015). This confirms the assumption presented in the 
first part of the article, that China’s objective is not to change the international 
norms but to improve and make them more fair and favourable to creating a 
global order tilted towards China’s development and its growing international 
influence. Of course, the new financial institution does represent an alternative to 
the international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, reflecting 
the global order established after World War II, that is no longer consistent with 
the economic global power distribution, especially in the aspects that concern 
voting rights. 
Through the participation in the creation and implementation of the 
NDB and the active role it plays within the institution, China realizes one its 
objectives, to become more attractive to the developing countries and build 
closer relations with them. To this purpose, Low Jiwei affirmed: “This bank will 
place greater emphasis on the needs of developing countries, have greater respect 
for developing countries’ national situations, and more fully embody the values of 
developing countries” (WILDAU, 2015). 
During the 7th Summit held in Ufa (Russia) on 9 July, 2015 in the presence 
of Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, Dilma Roussef, Narendra Modi and Jacob Zuma, 
the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserves Arrangement officially 
became operational. The five leaders underlined the nature of the NDB as an 
instrument for financing infrastructure and investment projects in the BRICS 
and other developing countries, and for enhancing cooperation between the 
BRICS members and CRA as an important step in the financial cooperation of 
the members. 
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Creation of financial institutions appears to be one of the main methods 
employed by China to serve its economic and political agenda. Only one month 
prior to the inauguration of the NDB, China and 49 countries signed the Articles 
of Agreements (AOA) of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), with 
the objective of funding projects in the developing countries chiefly in Asia. In the 
first stage, China planned to extend the membership only to the Asian countries, 
and the fact that many non-Asian countries, beginning with the UK, applied to 
join it probably left China quite surprised. Many European, African and Latin 
American countries are now Founding Members (PFMs) and the capital share 
distribution is 75% to 25% for the regional members and non-regional members 
accordingly. The development bank aims to improve the connectivity of the Asian 
region which is a key component of China’s Asian strategy, especially since Xi 
Jinping’s arrival to power. As suggested by Zheng Yongnian, China must establish 
strong relations with the developed and developing countries, but prioritize its 
relations with its neighbours because the greater power needs the support of its 
neighbouring countries in order to rise (GODEMENT, 2015, p. 4). 
With its engagement in the creation of these three financial arrangement, 
China is realizing its objectives: the creation of new multilateral institutions that 
will contribute to shape a new global order. 
StRenGthen the RelatIonS wIth emeRGInG CountRIeS 
thRouGh BRICS
China’s engagement in BRICS represents an important framework 
through which the country can strengthen its relations with the emerging and 
developing countries and present itself as engaged in defending the rights of these 
countries.
The Chinese President Hu Jintao presents the group as the defender and 
promoter of the interests of all the developing countries through reinforcement 
of the South-South cooperation and the promotion of the North-South dialog. 
In others word, the BRICS group has started to be presented as fundamental to 
the on-going economic globalization and the democratization of the international 
relations, through a fairer distribution of the global world public goods and 
inclusion of emerging powers (THE INDU, 2012). 
Strategically speaking, the creation of this new informal group has, 
of course, since its formation represented for China an important occasion to 
reinforce its bilateral relations with Brazil, India and Russia, all of who were 
defined strategic partners. 
Concerning South Africa, in particular, its formal admission into the 
group during the third BRICS Summit that occurred on 14/15 April 2011 in 
Hainan (China), undoubtedly represented an important success of the President 
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Zuma’s foreign policy, strongly supported by Hu Jintao of China. According to 
Naidu this invitation enabled Beijing to demonstrate the growing role of China 
as a global leader, especially with regard to the South and developing world, 
reflecting its willingness to be engaged with the third world (LI, 2013).
In August 2010, when China and South Africa signed the Beijing 
Declaration, the two countries expressed their desire to further strengthen and 
deepen their cooperation in both political and regional affairs by establishing a 
comprehensive strategic partnership based on equality, mutual benefit and common 
development, the first that China signed with an emerging country. Since the first 
China-Africa Forum which took place in 2000, China imposed its presence in 
the African continent. The relations between China and Africa are ancient and 
borne mainly on ideological bases during the ’50s and ’60s, and the symbol of this 
relation is probably constituted by the Tanzania-Zambia railway, built between 
1969 and 1975 and financed by China under Mao, despite the fact that the country 
was experiencing a troubled period, post the Cultural Revolution. 
Due to the natural resources and diplomatic sustenance of the African 
countries, the continent is becoming more and more a strategic stake for the 
emerging countries, especially for the other BRICS members. But, if the Brazilian 
and Indian presence in Africa is often considered by the local communities as 
beneficial for their territories because of their use of the local workforce and 
the transfer the technology to the local people, contributing to the general 
development of the African countries (BOKILO, 2011, p. 84), on the contrary, 
the Chinese presence often sparked protests because it was considered mainly 
advantageous for the Chinese companies alone. The use of the Chinese workforce 
in its infrastructure investment projects (mainly in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Angola, Zambia, Nigeria, Gabon and Mauritania) is considered a 
limitation for the development of the local communities, negatively affecting 
the image of China, accused of pursuing a neo-colonialist strategy in Africa. Of 
course, the Chinese interests in the African continent cannot be excluded from a 
general consideration of the reasons for the strong support offered by Hu Jintao to 
the entry of South Africa into BRIC. If its attention to the emerging powers and 
their inclusion in the global affairs is part of its soft strategy, it is true that Africa 
represents an important continent for the development of the Asian dragon. 
The inclusion of South Africa into BRIC was inspected and left the observers 
surprised, considering the comparatively smaller weight of the African country. 
According to some scholars it is difficult to perceive immediately how South Africa 
could fit into the group (WOOLDRIDGE, 2011). Undoubtedly its participation 
symbolizes the BRICS opening to the entire continent with a population of over 
one million people. Furthermore, for decades Africa was a “forgotten continent” 
for the western countries and its admission to this new platform of international 
cooperation demonstrated, for China, its willingness to be the nation leading on 
the inclusion of the emerging powers into the global system and contributing to 
the democratization of the international relations. But of course, South Africa 
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admission into BRIC represents a good opportunity for China to guarantee its 
national interest on the continent, and specifically, its main objective to assure 
the energy resources necessary to sustain the economic growth of the country. In 
2013, China imported 1.3 million barrels of oil per day from Africa (23% of the 
total), while Chinese investments in Africa exceeded US $25 billion. It is estimated 
that imported energy resources would account for 26% of the energy consumed in 
China in 2020, and would drop back down to around 15% in the following years 
(XU, 2014). Among China’s major companies, ZTE and Huawei are establishing 
their African Headquarters in South Africa, and Beijing decided to locate the 
African headquarters of the China-Africa Development Fund in Johannesburg 
(BESADA; TOK; WINTERS, 2013, p. 5).
After Africa, South America appears to be a very important region for 
China, especially since the leadership of Hu Jintao. Since 2013, Xi Jinping paid two 
official visits to the region and created the China-CELAC Forum (Community of 
Latin American and Carribean States) in 2015 during which Xi Jinping announced 
an investment of $250 billion in Latin America over the next decade. Despite 
Brazil presenting itself as the natural leader of the region, China has already 
become a major partner for the countries in this region and is trying to enhance 
its influence through BRICS. For example the 6th BRICS Summit held in Fortaleza 
in 2014, was the occasion for the organization of the BRICS-South America 
Summit, (an initiative of the Brazilian government),  with the presence, amongst 
others, of Nicolas Maduro (Venezuela), Evo Morales (Bolivia), Michelle Bachelet 
(Chile), Rafael Correa (Ecuador) and Cristina Fernandez Kirchner (Argentina). 
China is strongly intensifying its presence in South America because it is rich 
in natural resources and has a growing middle-class with a rising purchasing 
power. China is building its relationships based on receiving natural resources in 
exchange for loans necessary for the development of the South American region 
and improvement of the regional infrastructure system. 
BRICS and InteRnal StaBIlIty
China is on the path towards the realization of its Chinese Dream. To 
actually realize it, the government needs a national unity and national consensus 
for both domestic and foreign policies. The national cohesion and stability are 
both the objectives and prerequisites for  achieving the development of the 
country. The Chinese government will need to face serious changes in society 
in response to the demand of its growing population needs. The pride in the 
economic growth and its achievements in terms of national development are not 
sufficient to sustain the pact between the population and the Party. The population 
is profoundly affected by the social inequality and needs welfare in the areas of 
wealth, education, pension system, etc. The government will need to manage all 
these demands in a situation of economic recession. 
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This is the reason that Xi Jinping is intensifying messages to the 
population regarding the fact that the government is taking care of its future 
and its prosperity together with a strong foreign policy that aims at creating a 
prosperous environment in which China can once again find its centrality.  
A three-minute animated feature film titled “Briefing on Going with 
Uncle to SCO and BRICS” was published online in China. The video explains the 
significance of the BRICS and SCO summits (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) 
and presented an overview of the member countries and their influences. The 
cartoon shows President Xi Jinping, called “Uncle” in a friendly tone, probably 
to present the idea of proximity between the President and the population, and 
the eight international leaders riding together on a single bicycle. The expressions 
in the cartoon are very interesting: “realizing flourishing mutual development is 
the goal”, aimed at showing the unity among the members of the organizations. 
“Not like some people, always treating the world as their own personal property, 
making themselves the head of the household, rushing to others’ doorways to show 
off their muscles at the slightest provocation”, appears to be a clear reference to the 
United States and their unilateral manner of conducting international relations 
solely according to their own interests as against the “multilateral” actions by 
China and the other members of the BRICS. Another interesting aspect of the 
cartoon is that it depicts the friendly relationship between China and Russia. The 
carton shows Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping walking together i with a 
caption that states: “China-Russia relations have been very warm recently”, “Some 
people support it; others throw bricks. Attitudes are different because mentalities are 
different. Cold War thinking is already out” (RAMZY, 2015).
It is interesting to note that concerning Russia, just prior to Xi’s Moscow 
visit in May (to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II), a video 
expressing the Chinese citizens’ thoughts on Russia was distributed in China.   
After this video on BRICS and SCO, another one was circulated in the 
Chinese social media by central television, concerning the new Five-Year Plan 
(2016-2020) that the Communist Party was going to discuss from 26 to 29 
October, 2015. There are two versions of the same video, one in English, catering 
to the foreigners, and the other in Chinese. The video uses a few expressions like: 
“It’s a huge deal/Like how huge?/Like China huge?/Yeah, China huge./Wow, that’s 
really big!” This was clearly done to reveal that the government is initiating a great 
economic plan commensurate to the greatness of the Chinese nation.
what IS the futuRe of BRICS?
The role of BRICS in global governance is now facing greater challenges 
than ever before. The slowing economic growth in the BRICS countries could 
raise a debate on their credibility as a group in ascension. Though the cooperation 
has been expanding to include other policy areas like security for example, the 
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group should retain its focus on economic cooperation among them and with the 
other emerging powers. 
As the largest economy among the five countries, China’s vision and strategy 
regarding the future of the BRICS group becomes increasingly important. If China 
wants to upgrade its international status, trying to translate its economic power into 
international influence, and consider its role of ‘leader’ within the group, it has to 
promote a broader cooperation amongst the BRICS members, in order to transform 
BRICS from an economic concept to a geopolitical one (NIU, 2015).  
It is true that if China wants to affirm itself as a “Big Power” it must show 
its capacity in offering ideas and solutions to the conflicts and crises and contribute 
towards the achievement of globally relevant objectives through single initiatives 
and within the framework of its participation to multilateral institutions. Its 
serious engagement on the reduction of gas emission and fighting against climate 
change appears particularly significant. 
As suggested by the Nobel Prize winner, Muhammad Yunus, economist 
and social entrepreneur, to be effective the New Development Bank should 
be green, and focus on poverty eradication. According to him, the New 
Development Bank, should be able to achieve three ‘zeros’ by 2050: zero poverty, 
zero unemployment and zero net carbon emission through four basic strategies. 
First, BRICS should mobilize the power of the youth. Second, the strategy should 
be focused on technological innovations to solve human problems. Third, they 
should be able to encourage social business, through the creation of country-level 
social business funds as joint ventures with local partners, in order to resolve 
long-standing and complex social, economic and environmental problems that 
conventional businesses cannot solve. Fourth, human rights and good governance 
should be at the heart of the NDB (YUNUS, 2015).
China’s ability to encourage and contribute concretely to seek solutions to 
these dramatic questions that are solely the result of the human irresponsibility and 
mismanagement of public affairs both at national and international levels, within 
the framework of its participation to multilateral institutions, existenting or new 
ones, will mean that it will be able to assume the responsibilities that accompany its 
status of a rising power; even more so, considering its dimension and population 
size, with its 1.3 billion people representing 20% of the world population. If we 
consider that one out of every five people on the world is a resident of China, it 
is easy to understand the importance and necessity of China’s engagement and 
responsibility in world affairs both for the wellbeing of the Chinese population as 
well as for the whole of humanity. 
Its engagement in the group appears to be of fundamental importance 
for China’s interests, not only because it aims at shaping global order through 
the democratization of the international relations but also for the expansion of 
its own global interests. China needs its BRICS partners to guarantee peace and 
stability in their regions, which are crucial to sustain its own growth. Russia, for 
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example, is also a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the 
stability of the Central Asia, and cooperation with Russia are fundamental to 
the realization of the One Belt One Road project. Brazil, despite the on-going 
economic, political and social crises remains the major economy of the region and 
an important soybean supplier to China. 
It is easily conceivable that if BRICS will not affirm itself as a geopolitical 
entity, this will negatively affect China’s international image. This will depend 
on several factors - first on the members capacity to face their economic crisis 
and control the social dysfunctions, in an economy that appears more and more 
unstable. It appears that China, Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa will find it 
difficult to maintain the economic growth rate that they registered over the past. 
And second, their capacity to put their common interests and global interests 
at the core of their existence and resolve the internal rivalry within the group 
(CONTIPELLI; PICCIAU, 2015).
ConCluSIonS
Chinese leadership today, faces enormous challenges that involve 
profound changes, both internally and externally. Xi Jinping needs to strike the 
right balance between a sustainable internal growth and social stability on the one 
hand and the affirmation of China as a global power on the other. The national 
rejuvenation and the pursuit of a “central” position as a global actor, under the 
concept of the Chinese Dream, appear to be the chief aim of Chinese development. 
The foreign policy strategic objective is to realize the Chinese Dream, 
especially with the concept of Striving for achievement (Fen fa you wei) that 
involves a more active and voluntary role in international affairs. 
One of the concrete examples is that China wishes to be involved in global 
affairs and shape the global system through its participation in the BRICS group, 
which was identified by the Eighteenth Congress of the PCC, as one of the main 
multilateral avenues, in which China wants to invest its efforts to play an active 
role in a multipolar world (with the United Nations, G20 and SCO).
Its engagement in BRICS represents, for China, an important opportunity 
to achieve its foreign policy goals, on a new multilateral platform, bringing together 
the emerging powers and contributing to the reinforcement of the South-South 
cooperation and the promotion of the North-South dialogue, in which China 
plays the leading role. Since its establishment, China presented itself in the group 
as the defender and promoter of the interests of all emerging countries through, 
for example, the creation of the new financial institutions, (NDA and CRA) that 
will provide economic and financial support to the BRICS members, as well as the 
developing and less developed countries. 
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Furthermore, China’s engagement in BRICS appears of fundamental 
importance as its interest is focused not only on shaping the world order through 
the democratization of the international relations but also on the expansion of 
its global and economic interests, in particular, securing natural resources for 
domestic development and new markets essential for its manufactured products. 
As the largest economy among the five member countries, China’s vision 
and strategy regarding the future of BRICS appear very significant, and the group 
needs to improve its capacity to be an active actor in the resolution of the global 
issues (climate change, poverty eradication, security, conflicts resolutions and 
others) moving from an economic forum of cooperation to a geopolitical entity. 
China can be the leader of the group and demonstrate its ability to act on 
the the international stage. A hypothetical failure of the group could negatively 
affect China’s image as a global power and in some way deface the Chinese Dream. 
nota
1 Wang Yizhou is  also vice Dean of the School of International Studies, Peking University.
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abstract
This article aims at analyzing the involvement of China in the BRICS as an instrument 
to achieve its foreign policies goals and the realization of the Chinese Dream proposed 
by the current President Xi Jinping. The Chinese Dream is a broad concept of a great 
national revival that emphasized the sense of unity of the nation and the return of the 
country to its natural state of glory under the communist party leadership. In the first 
part, we will present an overview of the main objectives of the Chinese foreign policy, 
particularly from Xi Jinping’s era. Sequentially, these objectives will be discussed within 
the framework of the Chinese engagement in the BRICS to discuss the future of the group 
and its significance in the development of China as a global actor.
Keywords: China, BRICS, Multilateralism, Global Governance, New Global Order
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Resumo
O presente artigo tem como objetivo analisar o envolvimento de China nos BRICS, como 
instrumento para alcançar seus objetivos de política externa e a realização do “Chinese 
Dream” proposto pelo atual Presidente Xi Jinping. O “Chinese Dream” é um amplo conceito 
de renascimento nacional, que enfatiza o senso de unidade da nação e o retorno do país ao 
seu “estado natural de glória”, sob a liderança do Partido Comunista. Na primeira parte, 
apresentaremos uma visão geral dos principais objetivos da política externa chinesa, 
particularmente, referente ao mandato de Xi Jinping. Posteriormente, esses objetivos 
serão discutidos no contexto do envolvimento chinês nos BRICS, para analisar o futuro 
do grupo e sua importância no desenvolvimento da China como um ator global.
Palavras-chave: China. BRICS. Governança global. Nova Ordem Global.
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